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Introduction
During the 2007-8 global financial crisis, the international monetary system experienced an acute US dollar shortage that severely curtailed global trade and pressured international banking business (McCauley and McGuire, 2009; McGuire and von Peter, 2009 ). The US authorities, in response to the elevated strain in the global market, have arranged dollar swap lines with major central banks to mitigate the global dollar squeeze (Aizenman and Pasricha, 2010; Aizenman, Jinjarak and Park, 2011) . On Thursday, October 31, 2013, the network of central banks comprises the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Federal Reserve, and the Swiss National Bank agreed to convert their bilateral liquidity swap arrangements to standing arrangements until further notice.
1
The dollar squeeze critically illustrated the danger of operating a US-centric global financial system. Against this backdrop, China has actively implemented measures of promoting the cross-border use of the Chinese currency, the renminbi (RMB), to reduce its reliance on the US dollar. The aggressive policy move was considered a clear signal of China's efforts to internationalize RMB (Chen and Cheung, 2011; Cheung, Ma and McCauley, 2011) . The RMB swap line allows, say, the Bank of Korea sells its local currency to China for the RMB and, at the same time, agrees to reverse the transaction at a pre-specified exchange rate and date in the future. Then, the RMB can be lent to the banking sector in Korea to facilitate trading financing. Bank of Korea (2012) , for example, provides a schematic introduction of the swap operation. In principle, these RMB swap lines offer the liquidity that is necessary for 1 http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/monetary/20131031a.htm.
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Strictly speaking, the use of RMB to settle cross-border trade can be traced back to at least 2003 (State Administration of Foreign Exchange; 2003a, b in Chinese). These cross-border trade settlements were of quite small scales. Thus, we focus here only on the post-2008 agreements.
2 conducting RMB-denominated transactions overseas, and reduce China's dependence on the vehicle currency -the US dollar.
Since its inception, the bilateral RMB local currency swap agreement has become a staple feature of China's efforts of promoting the RMB use overseas. Besides trade settlements, the RMB swap line is perceived to be a backstop liquidity facility for offshore RMB trading that ensures the stability of offshore RMB markets. Compared with the US swap lines established during the global financial crisis, these Chinese swap lines are not there (just) for difficult times.
They are a part of the policy that integrates the RMB and China's financial sector with the global financial market. The swap agreement exemplifies China's vision of its role in the international monetary system.
In the following, we investigate the empirical factors that determine the establishment of China's bilateral RMB local currency swap agreements. We anticipate the trade activity, among other economic relationships, is a factor. Indeed, some earlier studies verified the role of trade activity (Garcia-Herrero and Xia, 2015; Liao and McDowell, 2015; Yang and Han, 2013). 3 It is quite well known that, given its unique development experiences, China's dealings with the rest of the world are not necessarily driven by pure economic considerations. Thus, noneconomic factors including political relationships and societal institutional characteristics can play a role forming China's bilateral RMB local currency swap line agreements.
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In addition to the likelihood of signing these agreements, we explore factors contributing to the size of these swap lines.
To anticipate results, it is found that the decision of establishing a Chinese bilateral RMB local currency swap line depends on economic factors, political considerations, and institutional characteristics. For instance, the trade intensity, economic size, strategic partnership, free trade agreement, corruption, and stability are found to be determining factors. Once a swap line agreement decision is made, then the size of the swap line is mainly affected by trade intensity, economic size, and the presence of a free trade agreement. The results are quite robust with respect to the choices of the Heckman two-stage framework or the proportional hazard model. The gravity effect captured by distances between China and its counterparts, if present, is mainly observed during the early part of the sample period under consideration.
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These studies defined trade actitivity differently. 
Preliminaries
After the 1997 Asian financial crisis, China became part of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations plus Three network and signed bilateral currency swap agreements under the Chiang Mai Initiative with other members.
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These swap agreements are established to fence off potential speculative attacks that can inflict serious economic pains to the region. Even though they have never been actually drawn upon, these dollar-based swap lines provide needed liquidity and resources during economic tough times. China's participation attests its commitment to maintain the stability of regional financial markets.
In the midst of the recent global financial crisis, Zhou (2009) For instance, offshore RMB markets, which were first established in Hong Kong, have been propagated to different time zones and different continents with a growing number of RMB-denominated assets. Over time, the local currency swap agreement that defines a specific and managed channel through which the RMB is made available overseas has become part of China's policy of promoting the offshore uses of its currency.
On top of its designated function of a backstop liquidity facility that ensures a smooth operation of offshore RMB markets, the bilateral RMB local currency swap agreement is view as a symbol of endorsement and support of RMB business overseas, and signifies trust between sovereignty authorities. The signing of the swap agreement, thus, is likely driven by both economic and political considerations. Table 1 Further, there is a large proportion of developing and emerging economies on the list. The circumstantial observations are in accordance with the view that China takes a regional approach to establish its global economic network. Typically, these agreements have a three-year tenor, and are renewed upon expiration. Of these 28 economies, only Belarus and Uzbekistan did not renew the swap agreements upon expiry. 
Empirical Determinants
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In this section we investigate the empirical determinants of China's bilateral RMB local currency swap line agreements. While a swap agreement is signed by two parties, we implicitly assume that China plays a main role in finalizing the decision. A practical consideration is that China has maintained a tight grip on capital movements across its border. Capital controls are in placed to regulate funds going in and out of China, and insulate the Chinese economy from external shocks.
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It is of China's interest to determine which economy to collaborate with in promoting the overseas use of its currency.
We 
To Sign or Not to Sign
The Heckman two-step procedure offers a framework to sequentially analyze decisions about setting up a swap line. The first decision is whether to sign or not to sign an agreement. It is studied using the specification: China's outward direct investment is used to characterize the investment link. The choice is driven by the observation that China has been promoting its investment overseas since the "Going Global" or "Stepping Out" strategy adopted in 2002.
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The ratio of foreign direct investment into China to its outward direct investment, for instance, declined from 21 in 2002 to 1.1 in 2014. In 12 years, China accelerated its pace of investing in oversea markets to catch up with the strong inflow. In January 2011, China launched the pilot program that permits outward direct investment be conducted in the RMB. Thus, the Going Global policy is a channel for China to deploy its capital and currency overseas, and to integrate with the global financial market.
The investment link variable is given by the ratio of an economy's foreign direct investment from China to its total foreign direct investment received. The bilateral and economy- Two distance variables are included in the vector DIS to capture the gravity effect that is commonly considered in studies on, say, trade and investment relationships. The first variable is a distance variable defined by the distance measured in kilometers between China's capital city and another economy's capital city. The second variable is an interaction variable defined by the product of a time dummy variable and the distance variable. The time dummy variable is 0 after 2011 and 1 otherwise. The interaction variable is included to assess if the gravity effect has changed three years after China started its bilateral local currency swap program.
The results of estimating the effects of ECI and DIS variables using the panel data probit regression with random effects are presented in columns 2 and 3 in Table 2 . Among the three 11
The "Going Global" strategy was discussed in, say, the 2002 issue of the Almanac of China's Foreign Economic Relations and Trade. Sometimes, the "Going Global" policy is referred to as the "Go Global" policy. Cheung and Qian (2009) , for example, is an early empirical study of China's outward direct investment behavior. economic variables included in ECI, both the trade intensity and economic size variables are highly significant, while the outward direct investment variable is not. (1) are summarized. The trade intensity variable is constructed based on the sum of exports and imports. See the text and data appendix for definitions of the variables. The notations ***, **, and * denote significance at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
The trade intensity effect is in accordance with the official assertion that the swap line is for facilitating bilateral trade.
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Further, in the initial stage of promoting the RMB overseas, the focus is on cross-border trade settlement. The finding is also consistent with China's foreign 12 Similar trade intensity effects are reported in, for example, Garcia-Herrero and Xia (2015), Liao and McDowell (2015) , and Yang and Han (2013) despite the effects are measured differently. 9 exchange policy. The economic size effect has a positive impact on China's decision to sign a swap agreement. While the effect is expected, it is not transparent when we look at the list of economies that have a swap agreement with China in Table 1 . The insignificance of the outward direct investment (ODI) variable may reflect the fact that overseas direct investment made in RMB is quite minute, and is only a nascent phenomenon.
In the presence of the two distance variables, the trade intensity and size variables retain their statistically significance but the magnitudes of their effects are reduced. The gravity effect, apparently, is only a relevant factor in the early phase of China's program of setting up local currency swap lines -the distance variable though is negative but not significant while the interaction variable is significantly negative. That is, China displayed a bias towards economies that are geographically close to itself in the first few years of setting up its global swap line network, though such a bias is not observed afterward.
The result attests China's sequential approach in developing its international relationship.
Looking at Table 1 These institutional variables offer a general assessment of a country's economic, societal, and political environments.
The estimated POL and INS effects are presented in the last two columns in Table 2 . In 13 They are four levels of strategic partners; namely, comprehensive strategic partners, strategic partners, comprehensive partners, and cooperative partners. While the cooperation with partner economies is deemed to be multi-levels and multi-directional, the exact coverage of collaboration programs varies even among economies in the same level of partnership. See the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for detail.
the pre-test, we noted that the three indexes under INS are quite highly correlated. To mitigate the multicollinearity effect, we added each of them sequentially to the regression separately and reported only the significant results.
As anticipated, an economy that is a strategic partner and a free trade partner is likely to have a local currency swap line with China. The coefficient estimate of the strategic partner dummy variable is smaller than that of the free trade agreement dummy variable. The relative estimated magnitude is in accordance with, at least, the initial proposed functionality of swap lines for facilitating bilateral trade.
In presence of the insignificant ODI and distance variables, the elements of INS are hardly significant in the statistical sense. Nonetheless, when the insignificant variables are excluded, it is found that the default and corruption variables are statistically significant. The last column in Table 2 , after filtering out the effect of irrelevant variables, presents the parsimonious specification that includes only significant explanatory variables. The result affirms that it is less likely for China to establish a local currency swap line with an economy if it has a default record or has a good corruption reputation, ceteris paribus.
The negative corruption effect; that is, corruption increases the chance to set up a swap line is perplexing. We note that a similar confounding corruption effect is found in, for example, the empirical specification of China's outward direct investment (Cheung, et al., 2012) . The result is likely driven by the relative high concentration of emerging and developing economies, which tend to have a not-so-good record on corruption. The empirical corruption effect, thus, may be related to China's strategy of going from regional to global, and from developing to developed economies to establish its own currency swap network. Cuervo-Cazurra (2006), for instance, argues that the similarities in the conditions of the institutional environment including corruption can promote economic interactions.
In sum, the decision to establish a bilateral local currency swap line facility is affected by economic, political and institutional characteristic considerations. The parsimonious specification under column 4 in Table 2 indicates that, according to the pseudo-R 2 statistics, the selected factors explain the data quite well.
3.2
The Size of Swap Agreement
In the current sub-section, we study the factors that determine the size of a bilateral local currency swap agreement signed by China. Data on economies that have a swap agreement with China are examined using the following specification
where it Swap is the log value of the size of the swap line that economy i has signed with China at time t, and it Mills is the inverse Mills ratio calculated from equation (1) and is included to control for potential biases arising from including only data from economies that have a swap arrangement.
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Are the reasons for signing a currency swap agreement and for deciding its size the same? We do not know. However, it seems not unreasonable to assume that these two decisions can be driven by similar factors, albeit with different degrees of importance. Thus, we initially included the explanatory variables of (1) in (2) The results of estimating (2) are presented in Table 3 in a format similar to the one in Table 2 . The results under Columns 1, 2, and 3 are similar, but not identical, to the corresponding ones in Table 2 . The trade and economic size variables have the expected effects on the size of swap arrangements. In the absence of political and institutional factors, both distance-related variables are significantly negative; that is the swap line value is inversely proportionally to the geographic distance from China (Column 2 of Table 3 ). Again, the result is in accordance with the circumstantial observation that China's counterparties have a high concentration in Asia;
especially in the early sample period. Nevertheless, the appeal to geographic distance seems over-simplistic -the gravity effect vanishes once other factors are incorporated in the specification (Columns 3 and 4 of Table 3 ).
According to the parsimonious representation given under Column 4, the value of a swap line is mainly determined by three factors; namely, the trade intensity, the economic size of the counterparty, and the presence of a bilateral free trade agreement. Combined, the three factors Technically speaking, (2) is the second stage regression of the Heckman two-stage process. The inverse Mills ratio is given by the probability density function over the cumulative distribution function estimated from (1), which includes both zero and non-zero SWD observations. Intuitively, the ratio captures the effect of truncating the sample and is included to control for selection biases in the second stage regression, which uses only observations associated with a positive swap line size. (2) are summarized. The trade intensity variable is constructed based on the sum of exports and imports. See the text and data appendix for definitions of the variables. The notations ***, **, and * denote significance at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
In passing, we note that the inverse Mills ratio is always statistically significant in Table 3 -it is prudential to include the ratio to control for possible biases induced by dropping the noswap-agreement observations. 14 3.3 Imports or Exports
The role of trade intensity in determining China's recent currency swap arrangements is affirmed in the previous two subsections. The swap line is meant initially to be a backstop liquidity facility that provides local currency liquidity to support cross-border trade.
Nevertheless, these swap lines have been seldomly drawn upon. A question is whether exports intensity and imports intensity carry the same weight in the process of setting up swap lines.
China's tight grip on the RMB restricts the global availability of the RMB. Anecdotal evidence indicates that, in the early phase of the RMB cross-border trade settlement program, the Chinese importers instead of exporters were the main users of the program. The possibility of foreigners to pay for their imports from China by the RMB is constrained because the RMB is not freely available to non-residents. The global liquidity of the RMB improves over time as the offshore RMB pool expands. Then, the RMB trade settlement scheme involves a more balanced of imports and exports activities.
Against this backdrop, we empirically assess the possible differential effects of imports and exports. Similar to the trade intensity variable, an economy's exports (imports) intensity variable is defined by the ratio of its exports to (imports from) China and its own total exports (imports). We re-estimated equations (1) and (2) with the trade intensity variable replaced with either the exports or the imports intensity variables. The results are reported in Tables 4 to 7 .
Specification by specification, the results reported under each column in Tables 2 and 3 are quite comparable to the corresponding ones in Tables 4 and 5 . In addition to the sign and the magnitude of coefficient estimates, the patterns of significance are similar. These results suggest that the role of exports intensity in determining China's swap agreements is almost identical to the trade intensity variable. Comparing the pseudo-R 2 and adjusted-R 2 estimates, we can infer that, compared with the trade intensity variable, the exports intensity variable offers a very marginally weaker explanatory power for the decision of establishing a swap line but explains slightly better the size of a swap line.
The results pertaining to the imports intensity variable presented in Tables 6 and 7 (1) are summarized. The trade intensity variable is constructed based on the volume of exports. See the text and data appendix for definitions of the variables. The notations ***, **, and * denote significance at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% level. (2) are summarized. The trade intensity variable is constructed based on the volume of imports. See the text and data appendix for definitions of the variables. The notations ***, **, and * denote significance at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
The results suggest that the trade effect on China's swap line arrangements is mainly driven by exports intensity considerations. When the exports of a foreign economy is more dependent on China, the more likely it has a bilateral local currency swap line with China, and the value of the swap line is likely to be larger. The finding does not contradict the observed low frequency of the use of these swap lines. The establishment of these swap lines, despite the stated purposes, has a heavy symbolic value, and serves mainly as an emergency liquidity facility.
The Cox Proportional Hazard Model
To offer an alternative perspective on the properties of China's bilateral local currency swap line agreements, we consider the Cox proportional hazard model (PHM, Cox (1972)) which is given by:
The variable hi(t), in the present context, is the probability density that a swap line agreement is established at time t conditional on a) there is no agreement signed earlier, and b) the explanatory variables in the vector xi. The generic name of hi(t) is the hazard ratio (or function). The probability, at time, of signing a swap line agreement depends on the baseline hazard rate h0(t); that is hi(t) when xi = 0, and the explanatory variables included in xi and the unknown parameters β. One advantage of PHM is that it is semiparametric and imposes no functional form on the baseline function h0(t).
The results of fitting the PHM with the trade intensity and other explanatory variables considered in subsection 3.1 are presented in Table 8 . Essentially, the findings affirm the relevant of trade intensity, economic size, strategic partnership, free trade agreement, and default history to the establishment of China's bilateral local currency swap lines. These significant variables have the same signs as those reported in Table 2 . The distance and corruption variables that are significant under the Probit setup in Table 2 are insignificant under PHM. (3), the proportional hazard model, are summarized. The trade intensity variable is constructed based on the sum of exports and imports. See the text and data appendix for definitions of the variables. The notations ***, **, and * denote significance at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
The estimation results based on the exports and imports intensity variables are presented in Tables 9 and 10 . Under PHM, the exports, and imports intensities garnered significant coefficient estimates that are of similar magnitudes, which are marginally smaller than the trade intensity variables. Among the three trade-intensity-related variables, the specifications that include the exports intensity variable usually yield the highest pseudo-R 2 estimates.
One main assumption of PHM is the "proportional hazard" assumption; that is, the chance for each economy to establish a swap line with China is proportional over time to any other economies in the sample. The time variability comes through the nonparameteric baseline hazard rate. To ensure that our data do not violate the "proportional hazard" assumption, we conducted the Schoenfeld residuals test (Schoenfeld, 1982) . The test results, which are not reported for brevity but are available upon request, indicate that the assumption is not rejected; that is, the results reported in Tables 8, 9 , and 10 are valid.
In sum, the semiparameteric PHM framework qualitatively affirms the findings derived from the Heckman two-stage framework, with the gravity effect being the exception. It is noted that the latter framework allows us to extract information on both the establishment and the value of swap line agreements, while the former gives information mainly on the (conditional) probability of signing a swap line agreement. (3), the proportional hazard model, are summarized. The trade intensity variable is constructed based on the volume of imports. See the text and data appendix for definitions of the variables. The notations ***, **, and * denote significance at, respectively, the 1%, 5% and 10% level.
Concluding Remarks
In the wake of the dollar shortage experienced in the midst of the global financial crisis, China initiated its program of establishing bilateral local currency swap lines to alleviate its dependences on the US dollar for international transactions. Since then, the currency swap arrangement has evolved to be part of the general effort to promote the cross-border use of the RMB. China's status in the global economy is arguably attested by its pre-eminence in the international trade arena. A global RMB definitely propelled China to another high level of international recognition. Against this backdrop, we study the factors affecting China's currency swap agreements that facilitate overseas uses of the RMB. Despite China's ongoing efforts to liberalize its financial markets, the conversion between offshore and onshore RMBs is typically conducted within designated channels including free trade zone, RQFII, and authorized RMB clearing bank overseas, foreign central banks' access to domestic central banks, …, etc. Thus, moving forward, the bilateral local currency swap line agreement will continue its role in promoting the global use of the RMBboth as a symbolic endorsement of offshore RMB activities in the partner's market, and as a RMB backstop liquidity facility.
